Patrick Steinhardt 1568d1562e wrapper: allow generating insecure random bytes
The `csprng_bytes()` function generates randomness and writes it into a
caller-provided buffer. It abstracts over a couple of implementations,
where the exact one that is used depends on the platform.

These implementations have different guarantees: while some guarantee to
never fail (arc4random(3)), others may fail. There are two significant
failures to distinguish from one another:

  - Systemic failure, where e.g. opening "/dev/urandom" fails or when
    OpenSSL doesn't have a provider configured.

  - Entropy failure, where the entropy pool is exhausted, and thus the
    function cannot guarantee strong cryptographic randomness.

While we cannot do anything about the former, the latter failure can be
acceptable in some situations where we don't care whether or not the
randomness can be predicted.

Introduce a new `CSPRNG_BYTES_INSECURE` flag that allows callers to opt
into weak cryptographic randomness. The exact behaviour of the flag
depends on the underlying implementation:

    - `arc4random_buf()` never returns an error, so it doesn't change.

    - `getrandom()` pulls from "/dev/urandom" by default, which never
      blocks on modern systems even when the entropy pool is empty.

    - `getentropy()` seems to block when there is not enough randomness
      available, and there is no way of changing that behaviour.

    - `GtlGenRandom()` doesn't mention anything about its specific
      failure mode.

    - The fallback reads from "/dev/urandom", which also returns bytes in
      case the entropy pool is drained in modern Linux systems.

That only leaves OpenSSL with `RAND_bytes()`, which returns an error in
case the returned data wouldn't be cryptographically safe. This function
is replaced with a call to `RAND_pseudo_bytes()`, which can indicate
whether or not the returned data is cryptographically secure via its
return value. If it is insecure, and if the `CSPRNG_BYTES_INSECURE` flag
is set, then we ignore the insecurity and return the data regardless.

It is somewhat questionable whether we really need the flag in the first
place, or whether we wouldn't just ignore the potentially-insecure data.
But the risk of doing that is that we might have or grow callsites that
aren't aware of the potential insecureness of the data in places where
it really matters. So using a flag to opt-in to that behaviour feels
like the more secure choice.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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